Tack för analysen, Pär! Kul att du och Karl fortsätter skriva och podda, det uppskattas!
Jag avstår köp, men förstår om det lockar mer riskbenägna investerare, som inte ser Rysslandskopplingen som ett problem.
Jag hade uppskattat om du hade nämnt blankarrapporten från Culper Research, även om du inte håller med dem.
Alltid bra att få andra sidan av myntet i en analys.
Några utdrag från blankarrapporten daterad 2024-09-19 (tag den för vad den är, tänk på att skribenten har en agenda, men tycker ändå att den är läsvärd och lärorik):
"Kaspi.kz (KSPI): The NASDAQ-Listed Fintech Moving Money for Criminals and Kleptocrats"
"... in the wake of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and into 2024, Russia has contributed materially to Kaspi’s reported growth."
"... vast, longstanding ties to bad actors including sanctioned oligarchs and Russian mobsters."
"We believe Kaspi’s premium valuation and US listing are at risk, and shares are headed lower."
1-) Kaspi revenues: Kaspi generates almost all of its revenues from Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan and Ukraine only account to 0.4% of total revenues. Merchants must submit a Kazakh tax ID (which makes them a KZ resident) and complete a KYC form.
In our view, the short-seller report missed the fact that Russians could settle in Kazakhstan and that there was still trade between Russia and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan also has a substantial Russian ethnic minority and sells most of its oil through a pipeline that goes through Russian territory. It's no secret that these countries are still have strong economic and social ties despite the sanctions.
2-) Raiffeisen: Raiffeisen Bank Russia is part of Raiffeisen International and is not subject to sanctions, and Kaspi also does business with BNY Mellon, Citi, Socgen, LBW and Commerzbank.
3-) Non-resident deposits: Non-residents account for 2.8% of deposits, and Kaspi's definition of a non-resident is all foreign nationals without a Kazakh residence permit.
This does not entirely disprove the argument that Russian deposits played a significant role in the growth of Kaspi's deposits because there are Russian citizens who are residents in Kazakhstan – just like there are resident Russian citizens in Georgia, Armenia, the UK and the US.
That said, we think the growth from Russian "resident" deposits should also be limited as Kazakhstan is a relatively large country with >19mn population. Kazakh interior ministry said in October 2022 that 200k Russians had entered the country since the start of the war, and chances are low that resident Russians had moved the needle so much for Kaspi. The Kazakh population has grown by 1.5% annually in the past 20 years and there is no shortage of new customers for banks.
4-) Only 0.3% of Marketplace GMV is related to non-resident purchases
5-) On the CEO's Azerbaijan classifieds sale: Revenues in Azerbaijan classified business grew by 46% CAGR between 2020-2023. We think the short seller's overvaluation argument was biased as it overlooked that the acquisition was pre-IPO. Even if Kaspi overpaid, in our view, that argument should not be based on a revenue multiple.
6-) Portmone acquisition in Ukraine: The sellers included EBRD and other development institutions. The short-seller argued that Portmone was a shell company with ties to the Russian mafia.
7-) Yulia Kim, head of e-grocery business, is not related to Vyacheslav Kim
Tack för att ni delar detta fina fynd. Gedigen genomgång av caset som uppskattas mycket. Stark öppning på bloggen! :)
Tack för analysen, Pär! Kul att du och Karl fortsätter skriva och podda, det uppskattas!
Jag avstår köp, men förstår om det lockar mer riskbenägna investerare, som inte ser Rysslandskopplingen som ett problem.
Jag hade uppskattat om du hade nämnt blankarrapporten från Culper Research, även om du inte håller med dem.
Alltid bra att få andra sidan av myntet i en analys.
Några utdrag från blankarrapporten daterad 2024-09-19 (tag den för vad den är, tänk på att skribenten har en agenda, men tycker ändå att den är läsvärd och lärorik):
"Kaspi.kz (KSPI): The NASDAQ-Listed Fintech Moving Money for Criminals and Kleptocrats"
"... in the wake of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and into 2024, Russia has contributed materially to Kaspi’s reported growth."
"... vast, longstanding ties to bad actors including sanctioned oligarchs and Russian mobsters."
"We believe Kaspi’s premium valuation and US listing are at risk, and shares are headed lower."
Hela rapporten:
https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/cc91fda7-4669-4d1b-81ce-a0b8d77f25ab/downloads/4147ea18-c5e3-4426-8c1f-a74f1c521777/Culper_KSPI_9-19-24.pdf?ver=1726752239297
Hej Dolly 18,
Jag tog inte med det medvetet då svaret från ledningen var transparent och bra enligt de förvaltare jag pratat med. Vilket gör att jag inte tycker det var relevant. Här är länken till ledningens svar: https://ir.kaspi.kz/media/Kaspi.kz_Responds_to_Investor_Questions.pdf
Här är kort sammanfattande kommentar:
1-) Kaspi revenues: Kaspi generates almost all of its revenues from Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan and Ukraine only account to 0.4% of total revenues. Merchants must submit a Kazakh tax ID (which makes them a KZ resident) and complete a KYC form.
In our view, the short-seller report missed the fact that Russians could settle in Kazakhstan and that there was still trade between Russia and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan also has a substantial Russian ethnic minority and sells most of its oil through a pipeline that goes through Russian territory. It's no secret that these countries are still have strong economic and social ties despite the sanctions.
2-) Raiffeisen: Raiffeisen Bank Russia is part of Raiffeisen International and is not subject to sanctions, and Kaspi also does business with BNY Mellon, Citi, Socgen, LBW and Commerzbank.
3-) Non-resident deposits: Non-residents account for 2.8% of deposits, and Kaspi's definition of a non-resident is all foreign nationals without a Kazakh residence permit.
This does not entirely disprove the argument that Russian deposits played a significant role in the growth of Kaspi's deposits because there are Russian citizens who are residents in Kazakhstan – just like there are resident Russian citizens in Georgia, Armenia, the UK and the US.
That said, we think the growth from Russian "resident" deposits should also be limited as Kazakhstan is a relatively large country with >19mn population. Kazakh interior ministry said in October 2022 that 200k Russians had entered the country since the start of the war, and chances are low that resident Russians had moved the needle so much for Kaspi. The Kazakh population has grown by 1.5% annually in the past 20 years and there is no shortage of new customers for banks.
4-) Only 0.3% of Marketplace GMV is related to non-resident purchases
5-) On the CEO's Azerbaijan classifieds sale: Revenues in Azerbaijan classified business grew by 46% CAGR between 2020-2023. We think the short seller's overvaluation argument was biased as it overlooked that the acquisition was pre-IPO. Even if Kaspi overpaid, in our view, that argument should not be based on a revenue multiple.
6-) Portmone acquisition in Ukraine: The sellers included EBRD and other development institutions. The short-seller argued that Portmone was a shell company with ties to the Russian mafia.
7-) Yulia Kim, head of e-grocery business, is not related to Vyacheslav Kim
Hej Pär, och tack för ett uttömmande svar. Du har bra koll, och nu har vi andra också blivit lite klokare.
Kul med ett lite mer ”exotiskt” bolag. Keep em coming 👍🏽